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Introduction
The Children's Television Act of 19901 was Congress' response to
a decade during which children's television programming became, in
effect, a remarkably profitable toy catalog. The Act limited the
amount of advertising time permitted during children's programs and
required the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to
consider broadcasters' service of children's educational and
informational needs. Years of controversy over how best to achieve
the Act's objectives followed its passage. A recent White House
summit meeting-attended by regulators, broadcasters, and public
interest advocates-resulted in an accord requiring each station to air
three hours of educational programming for children per week.2
One element of the Children's Television Act, however, has been
forgotten entirely in the flurry of activity regarding its enforcement.
The new law directed the FCC to address the most serious problem
with children's television in the 1980's-"program-length
commercials," that is, programs principally designed to sell toys or
other products associated with the programs. To illustrate, the
television specials offered to children during the 1993 holiday season
included a program called Nick and Noel. Toys 'R' Us toy stores
created the show, which featured two cuddly characters-a dog, Nick,
and a cat, Noel-available only at Toys 'R' Us stores. On the day
before the program aired, Toys 'R' Us placed large newspaper ads
alerting children to the show and reminding them where Nick and
Noel dolls could be purchased.3
Surprisingly, the FCC did not quickly condemn Nick and Noel,
although it was a particularly clear example of the kind of program-
length commercials that concerned Congress. In fact, Nick and Noel
did not violate FCC rules because, despite the Children's Television
Act, the FCC never adopted an adequate policy against program-
length commercials aimed at children. To the contrary, in its rule-
making proceeding on program-length commercials, the FCC: (1)
ignored Congress' concerns; (2) misconstrued the issue presented; (3)
adopted rules placing virtually no new restrictions on broadcasters;
and (4) misleadingly characterized the approach taken as consistent
with long-standing policy.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990)(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 303(b), 394
(1994)).
2. See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
3. Consumer Groups Assail Kidfomercials, THE RECORD, Dec. 30, 1993, at B1.
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This article examines the FCC's treatment of the program-length
commercial issue in the aftermath of the Children's Television Act. It
describes how the FCC's rule-making proceeding resulted in an
ineffective policy. Further, it suggests how the FCC may better
respond to the problem of program-length commercials by reviewing a
broadcaster's overall handling of commercialization and children's
television before granting a renewal of that broadcaster's license. Such
a policy would represent a return to the approach taken by the FCC in
the past, would be flexible enough to be effective, and would be
constitutional within the boundaries established for regulation of
broadcast and commercial speech.
I
The Hot Wheels Era
Advertising in children's television presents unique concerns that
do not apply to advertising directed at adults. Children are born
unable to appraise commercial messages critically and realistically.
Until approximately six years of age, a child cannot distinguish
television commercials from programs, and a child generally does not
begin to recognize the persuasive intent of commercials for several
more years." Thus, children are uniquely vulnerable to exploitation by
advertising because they cannot adequately recognize and evaluate it.
That is particularly true of program-length commercials-television
programs with commercial content.5
The FCC first faced the problem of program-length commercials
aimed at children in the late 1960's. Eddie Smarden, vice president of
the advertising agency for toy manufacturer Mattel, developed an idea
for a show which combined the virtues of Archie comics with Mattel's
4. The FCC first recognized those facts in 1974. See In re Petition of Action for Children's
Television (ACT) for Rulemaking Looking Toward the Elimination of Sponsorship and
Commercial Content in Children's Programing, Children's Television Report and Policy
Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 15 (1974)[hereinafter Children's Television Report and Policy
Statement]. The Federal Trade Commission has reached the same conclusion. See Children's
Advertising, Termination of Rulemaking Proceeding, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,710 (1981)[hereinafter
Termination of Rulemaking Proceeding].
5. As discussed below, it is important to distinguish program-length commercials from
other concerns regarding children's television and advertising. A typical half hour of children's
television consists of a 24 to 25 minute program interrupted by a number of shorter spot
advertisements. One concern is the amount of time devoted to these spot ads. A second concern
is the relationship between the program and the spot ads. If Mighty Morphin Power Rangers is
interrupted by a Power Rangers toy commercial, will children confuse the two? Program-length
commercials present a third concern, that is, the commercial nature of the programs themselves.
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hugely popular Hot Wheels line of toy racing cars.6 The Hot Wheels
program debuted on ABC in 1969. Mattel purchased advertising time
during the show. Commercials for the Hot Wheels cars aired during
other Saturday morning programs on ABC, but not during the Hot
Wheels program itself. A rival toy manufacturer complained to the
FCC that the cartoon was "in reality a 30-minute commercial for
Mattel's miniature racing cars." 7 The FCC concluded that the body of
the Hot Wheels program contained commercial material and required
ABC to log various parts of the show as commercial matter, including
the opening theme song and all audio or video references to the words
"Hot Wheels."8 The FCC's central concern was that the "pattern
subordinates programing in the interest of the public to programing in
the interest of its saleability." 9 ABC soon canceled the Hot Wheels
series.
The FCC maintained that attitude toward children's television
throughout the 1970's. In 1971, for example, a newly-formed interest
group, Action for Children's Television, asked the FCC to implement
a radical three-part policy: elimination of all spot advertising during
children's television, prohibition of all product references during
children's programs, and imposition of a mandatory minimum of
fourteen hours per week of children's programming per broadcaster. 10
In its landmark 1974 report on children's television, the FCC chose not
to adopt such per se rules, but promised to "closely examine
commercial activities in programs designed for children on a case-by-
case basis."' Thus, while the FCC did not establish any specific
definition of a program-length commercial, it exercised scrutiny over
the commercial content of children's television programming.
However, extreme cases like Hot Wheels were rare.
6. In re ABC Concerning Logging of Hot Wheels Program, 23 F.C.C.2d 132,132 (1970).
7. In re Complaint of Topper Corp. Concerning ABC and Mattel, Inc., 21 F.C.C.2d 148,
148 (1969).
8. In reABC, supra note 6, at 132.
9. Complaint of Topper, supra note 7, at 149.
10. In re Petition of Action for Children's Television (ACT) for Rulemaking Looking
Toward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programing,
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Propose Rulemaking, 28 F.C.C.2d 368,368 (1971).
11. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 14.
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II
Deregulation in the 1980's
The tide turned in the early 1980's. American Greeting Cards was
the first to strike gold, when it introduced Strawberry Shortcake and
quickly realized more than one billion dollars in sales from the
character 2 Other manufacturers realized the potential profits of the
marketing strategy-the creation and heavy marketing of a licensed
character through television. A flood of imitators followed.
Meanwhile, the National Association of Broadcasters, threatened with
an antitrust action, agreed to abandon its code of self-regulation.
13
That code had imposed some restrictions on advertising during
children's programming.
Not to be outdone by the toy and broadcast industries, the FCC
contributed to the proliferation of program-length commercials aimed
at children by its near complete deregulation of children's television in
1984. The Commission declined to adopt any specific advertising or
programming standards to replace those of the abandoned National
Association of Broadcasters' code 24 In children's television, as in all
programming, broadcasters were no longer required to ascertain the
needs of the community and were no longer subject to any maximum
limits on advertising time per hour.'5 Action for Children's Television
challenged the removal of the children's television advertising
guidelines and won a ruling that the FCC's decision lacked a
"reasoned basis," forcing the FCC to reopen its proceeding.' 6
In the meantime, He-Man, Pac-Man, The Care Bears, My Little
Pony, and The Transformers dominated children's television. Between
1983 and 1988, the number of toy-based programs on the air jumped
from thirteen to more than seventy, and revenue from sales of related
products rose from $26.7 billion to $64.6 billion.17 Despite the efforts
12. Tom Engelhardt, The Shortcake Strategy, in TODD GITLIN, WATCHING TELEVISION 73
(1986).
13. United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982).
14. In re Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, Report and Order,
96 F.C.C.2d 634,655 (1984).
15. See In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Report and Order,
98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077 (1984); In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358,359 (1986).
16. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741,745 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
17. Joint Comments of Action for Children's Television, et al., MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 38-
39 (Jan. 30, 1991). The Comments, Reply Comments, Petitions for Reconsideration, Oppositions,
and Joint Replies to Oppositions from MM Dkt. No. 90-570 cited herein are on file with the
FCC.
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of Action for Children's Television and the National Association for
Better Broadcasting, the FCC declined to regulate these new shows. In
addition, the FCC refused to prohibit a variety of profit-sharing
arrangements such as the one used to market the Thunder Cats
program and toys. Under that scheme, if a station aired the cartoon
and reached, for example, 4% of U.S. homes, the station would
receive 2% of the national profits from the toy line. The FCC felt that
the arrangement was "an innovative technique" which did not
contravene broadcasters' duty to serve the public interest.18 The FCC
also refused to restrict barter sales at below-market prices. For
example, the producers of He-Man and the Masters of the Universe
sold each episode to stations in exchange for two minutes of
commercial time on that station. The FCC concluded that such barter
arrangements presented no problem unless the producer gave the
programming to the station for no charge or a nominal charge. 19 In
sum, the FCC closed its eyes to a wave of program-length commercials
that dominated children's television in the 1980's, programs that
Rupert Murdoch justly called a "prostitution of the broadcaster's
function."'
III
The Children's Television Act of 1990
Congress originally passed a measure on children's television in
1988, but President Reagan pocket vetoed the bill.2' A very similar bill
emerged from Congress in 1990 and became law after President Bush
neither signed nor vetoed it. The Act had four components. First, it
placed quantitative limits on the amount of commercials permitted
during children's television: 10.5 minutes per hour on weekends and 12
minutes per hour on weekdays. 22 Second, it required the FCC to
consider whether a station seeking renewal of its broadcast license has
18. In re Petition for Rule Making to Prohibit Profit-Sharing Arrangements in the
Broadcasting of Children's Programming, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 709,
713 (1985)[hereinafter Memorandum Opinion and Order].
19. In re Complaint of National Association for Better Broad. Against Television Station
KCOP, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 4988 (June 2, 1989), on remand, National
Ass'n for Better Broad. v. FCC, 830 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
20. The Thinking Man's Media Baron, BROADCASTING, Apr. 13, 1987, at 70.
21. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Children's Television Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1456 (Nov. 5, 1988).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 303a(b) (1994).
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served the educational and informational needs of its young viewers,3
Third, it directed the FCC to consider the program-length commercial
issue and to resolve its ongoing proceeding on children's television and
advertising?4 Fourth, it established the National Endowment for
Children's Educational Television to award grants for the production
of educational children's television25
In their remarks on the Children's Television Act of 1990 and its
unsuccessful precursor in 1988, members of both the Senate and the
House made clear that the legislation was a response to the FCC's
abdication of responsibility in the area.' Driven by "pure ideology," 7
the FCC had embarked on a "deregulatory rampage" 28 and had
"completely fallen down on the job" with respect to protection of
children.' While the Children's Television Act did not contain specific
directions to the FCC on how to resolve the program-length
commercial question, Congress clearly expected an aggressive policy.
Senator Wirth emphasized that "[b]y no means, however, does this
measure abandon the issue of children's product-related
programming.' '3° Virtually all of the legislators who spoke on the bill
mentioned the problem of program-length commercials.3' They
decried how children's television had become "the video equivalent of
a Toys-R-Us catalog."'  Representative Swift gave the issue central
importance:
The interest here is whether or not, and this was central to the
hearings we held, children and virtually children alone in our society
are going to be subject to program-length commercials, commercials
which begin at the beginning of the program and run all the way to
23. 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a)(2).
24. Pub. L. No. 101-437,104 Stat. 996, § 104 (not codified).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 394(b) (1994).
26. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S16,857 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988)(statements of Sen. Inouye and
Sen. Metzenbaum); 134 CONG. REC. H3984 (daily ed. June 7, 1988)(statement of Rep. Eckart).
27. 134 CONG. REC. H3984 (daily ed. June 7, 1988)(statement of Rep. Miller).
28. 135 CONG. REC. S7437 (daily ed. June 23,1989)(statement of Sen. Wirth).
29. 134 CONG. REC. S16,857 (daily ed. Oct. 19,1988)(statement of Sen, Hollings).
30. 136 CONG. REC. S16,341 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Wirth).
31. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H5245 (daily ed. July 23, 1990)(statement of Rep. Markey); id.
at H5246 (statement of Rep. Rinaldo); id. at H5248 (statement of Rep. Bryant); 136 CONG. REC.
S10,124 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)(statement of Sen. Lautenberg); id. at S10,127 (statement of Sen.
Wirth); 136 CONG. REC. S184 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1990)(statement of Sen. Inouye); 135 CONG. REC.
S7437 (daily ed. June 23, 1989)(statement of Sen. Wirth); 135 CONG. REC. E275 (daily ed. Feb. 2,
1989)(statement of Rep. Tauke); 134 CONG. REC. S16,858 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988)(statement of
Sen. Metzenbaum); 134 CONG. REc. E1889 (daily ed. June 8,1988)(statement of Rep. Downey).
32. 136 CONG. REC. H5245 (daily ed. July 23, 1990)(statement of Rep. Markey).
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the credits, commercials which act as programs because what they
have done is taken the product they are selling and turned it into the
central character of the program itself. That is the governmental
interest.
33
The Act's proponents made clear that they expected the FCC to
take notice of Congress' concern. Representative Bruce stated that
"we are putting the FCC on notice that we are serious about
protecting our children from advertising disguised as programming."'
The legislators indicated that they would revisit the issue if the FCC
failed to adequately resolve the problem.'
IV
The FCC's Answer to Program-Length Commercials
Despite Congress' expressions of concern, the FCC did not take
an aggressive position against program-length commercials in the rule-
making that followed passage of the Children's Television Act. The
FCC proposed to define a program-length commercial as one where
(1) the program's content relates to a product and (2) spot
advertisements for that product air during the program.3 In short, a
broadcaster cannot run spot advertisements for GoBots toys during
the half hour when the GoBots program airs. During ensuing
proceedings, the FCC agreed to alter its proposed definition in one
minor respect. The FCC's initial definition did not address
advertisements that appear after the end of one show and before the
beginning of the next. Initially, the FCC felt that sixty seconds
provided sufficient separation between a program and related ads,
given "the short attention spans of children." 3 After child psychology
experts disputed the validity of that reasoning, the FCC modified the
rule, requiring that a program and related advertisements be separated
by intervening and unrelated program material38 In other words, the
33. 134 CONG. REc. H3982 (daily ed. June 7, 1988) (statement of Rep. Swift).
34. Id. at H3981 (daily ed. June 7, 1988)(statement of Rep. Bruce).
35. 136 CONG. REC. S16,845 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990)(statement of Sen. Lautenberg); 136
CONG. REC. H8537 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990)(statement of Rep. Markey); 136 CONG. REC. S10,124
(daily ed. July 19,1990)(statement of Sen. Wirth); id. at S10,127 (statement of Sen. Inouye).
36. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 5 FCC Rcd. 7199, 7201 (Nov. 8, 1990)[hereinafter Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking].
37. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Report and
Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 2111, 2118 (Apr. 9, 1991)[hereinafter April 1991 Order].
38. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5093, 5099 (Aug. 1, 1991)[hereinafter
August 1991 Order].
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GoBots advertisement may not air until after the opening credits of
the next program. With that modification, the FCC's definition
became its final rule on the subject.
In so defining program-length commercials, the FCC
misconstrued the issue before it. The FCC treated the problem solely
as one concerning the relationship between children's programs and
spot advertisements, boldly claiming that its definition directly
addressed the "fundamental regulatory concern" of interweaving
"program content and commercial matter." 3 The FCC refused to
acknowledge that such interweaving is possible within a program itself,
even without spot ads. "This request," the FCC revealingly wrote,
"begs the basic dilemma: how to distinguish a program from a
promotion."' The FCC mistakenly looked to determine whether a
show is a program-length commercial based not on the program's
content, but on the advertising environment which surrounds it.4 By
doing so, the FCC failed to address the regulatory concern which
Congress had in mind.42
Not only did the FCC's rule on program-length commercials fail
to accomplish what Congress intended, it essentially failed to
accomplish anything at all. The FCC admitted that its definition
"harmonizes with, and codifies to some degree, existing policies with
respect to host-selling and adequate separation of commercial from
program material."'43 In fact, the FCC's definition was quite similar to
existing policies. The host-selling rule prohibits "program talent or
other identifiable program characteristics" from delivering any sort of
commercial pitches during a program.' 4 That rule alone would prevent
a broadcaster from airing spot ads featuring the GoBots characters
during the GoBots program. Thus, the FCC's rule-making had little
net practical effect. As one court recognized, "[a] regulation perfectly
reasonable and appropriate in the face of a given problem may be
39. April 1991 Order, supra note 37, at 2118.
40. Id. at 2126 n.135.
41. See Joint Comments of Action for Children's Television, et al., supra note 17, at 46;
Comments of American Academy of Pediatrics, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 2 (Jan. 30, 1991);
Comments of American Psychological Association, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 9-10 (Jan. 30, 1991);
Comments of Donald McGannon Communication Research Ctr., MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 26
(Jan. 30,1991).
42. See Petition for Reconsideration of Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad., et al., MM Dkt. No.
90-570, at 2 (May 29, 1991).
43. April 1991 Order, supra note 37, at 2118.
44. August 1991 Order, supra note 38, at 5097.
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highly capricious if that problem does not exist."45 The FCC's rule was
such a response to a nonexistent problem.
Inevitably, the FCC's rule-making proceeding on program-length
commercials came to nothing, given the impossible requirements that
the FCC, along with representatives of the toy, broadcasting, and
advertising industries, demanded of alternative proposals. First, the
FCC questioned any proposal that raised even a potential First
Amendment issue.' Second, the FCC suggested that any alternative
proposal establish a bright-line rule ensuring "certainty in
application."'47 Finally, the FCC required that such a proposal be
neither under nor overinclusive. Out of the endless variety of possible
programs and marketing arrangements, the FCC demanded that an
alternative proposal allow mechanical identification of those that
deserve to be labeled program-length commercials. The FCC
emphasized the product ties of such acclaimed programs as Sesame
Street and Wonderful World of Walt Disney.4 Industry representatives
sounded the same chord, noting that Sesame Street generates millions
of dollars of licensed product sales every year, and claiming that it
would be difficult to adopt a policy that would vanquish He-Man
without also razing Sesame Street.49 In other words, the FCC's
requirements could only be met by a perfect rule, but there is no
perfect abstract rule for defining a program-length commercial.
45. Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 458 F.2d 731,742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1074 (1972); see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977)(holding programming limits on pay cable television might be appropriate if
problem is how cable can best "supplement" broadcasting, but capricious if question is really how
cable can become broadcast television's equal).
46. See August 1991 Order, supra note 38, at 5099; April 1991 Order, supra note 37, at 2118;
see also Reply Comments of American Association of Advertising Agencies, MM Dkt. No. 90-
570, at 4-7 (Feb. 25, 1991); Comments of Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n, et al., MM Dkt. No.
90-570, at 2-10 (Jan. 22, 1991).
47. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 36, at 7201.
48. April 1991 Order, supra note 37, at 2117; Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note
36, at 7201.
49. See Reply Comments of Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 2-6
(Feb. 20, 1991); Comments of Disney, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 17-18 (Jan. 30, 1991); Comments
of Fisher Broad., MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 11 (Jan. 30, 1991); Comments of HSN
Communications, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 26 (Jan. 30, 1991); Comments of Joint Broadcast
Parties, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 27 (Jan. 30, 1991); Comments of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters,
MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 16 (Jan. 30, 1991); Comments of Toy Mfrs. of Am., MM Dkt. N6. 90-570,
at 5-6 (Jan. 30, 1991).
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Further, the FCC claimed that it was not, in fact, relying on the
difficulty of line-drawing in rejecting proposed alternative policies.
50
Most misleadingly, the FCC claimed that the program-length
commercial rule it adopted was consistent with FCC policy dating
back to the early 1970's. To support that assertion, the FCC repeatedly
quoted from its 1974 decision on program-length commercials aimed
at adults: "The primary test is whether the purportedly non-
commercial segment is so interwoven with, and in essence auxiliary to,
the sponsor's advertising ...that the entire program constitutes a
single commercial promotion for the sponsor's products or services."51
The FCC, however, made careful use of an ellipsis in harking
back to the 1974 policy. The original definition read: "The primary test
is whether the purportedly non-commercial segment is so interwoven
with, and in essence auxiliary to the sponsor's advertising (if in fact
there is any formal advertising) to the point that the entire program
constitutes a single commercial promotion for the sponsor's products
or services."' Thus, the FCC's 1974 decision recognized that a
program-length commercial might not have any spot advertisements,
and that a program may be properly categorized as a program-length
commercial because of the commercial content of the program itself.'
The FCC's pretense of consistency is further undermined by
comparison of its definition of a program-length commercial with FCC
decisions from the early 1970's. For example, the Hot Wheels program
would not be a program-length commercial under the FCC's current
rule because the program did not contain spot ads for Hot Wheels toys.
By contrast, the FCC's current rule reaches some programs that were
not defined as program-length commercials by the FCC in the 1970's.
For example, in 1971, NBC requested an FCC advisory opinion
regarding its plan to begin airing a "well-known and respected
educational children's program which has been in existence for 15 or
20 years. '' During every episode, NBC planned to run one or two
50. August 1991 Order, supra note 38, at 5099 (quoting Joint Reply of Action for Children's
Television and Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad., MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 5 (July 10, 1991)).
51. See April 1991 Order, supra note 37, at 2127 n.144; Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
supra note 36, at 7201.
52. In re Public Notice Concerning the Applicability of Comm'n Policies on Program-
Length Commercials, 44 F.C.C.2d 985, 986 (1974)(emphasis added)(footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 986 n.5 ("Some program-length commercials contain no separate or formal
advertisements as such.").
54. In re Request by NBC for Ruling on Commercial Announcements, 29 F.C.C.2d 67, 67
(1971).
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spot ads for a product bearing the name and likeness of the program's
principal performer. The FCC advised NBC that the program would
not be considered a program-length commercial. 5 It would be under
the FCC's current rule. Thus, compared to the approach taken in the
1970's, the FCC's new rule on program-length commercials goes
further in some respects but less far in others.
The FCC's rule-making on program-length commercials
ultimately failed to address the problem at issue. In the process of
adopting its policy, the FCC disregarded the intentions of Congress
and misused FCC precedents. It is therefore little wonder that
Senators Inouye and Wirth chided FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes for





The FCC's program-length commercial rule pleased toy makers
and broadcasters. It displeased interest groups that hoped the
Children's Television Act would improve children's television.
Although those groups suggested alternatives to the FCC's proposed
rule, none of the suggestions won the FCC's favor.
Two groups, Action for Children's Television and the National
Association for Better Broadcasting, suggested an alternative rule
focusing on intent.' Did the producer and licensee aim to educate and
entertain viewers, or was the primary purpose to promote products? 58
The two groups supplemented their intent test with a "two-year rule."
If a program debuted within two years before or after the introduction
of a related product, there would be a rebuttable presumption that it is
a program-length commercial. 59 The groups recommended the two-
55. Id. at 68.
56. Letter of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye and Sen. Timothy E. Wirth to Chairman Alfred C.
Sikes, at 2 (Mar. 27, 1991), available in MM Dkt. No. 90-570.
57. Joint Comments for Action for Children's Television, et al., supra note 17, at 45;
Comments of Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad., MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 33-34 (Jan. 31, 1995).
58. Joint Comments of Action for Children's Television, et al., supra note 17, at 44;
Comments of Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad., supra note 57, at 30.
59. Joint Comments of Action for Children's Television, et al., supra note 17, at 45;
Comments of Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad., supra note 57, at 34. When it became clear the FCC
was not well-disposed to their suggestion, the two groups cut back their suggestion to a one-year
rule. See Petition for Reconsideration of Action for Children's Television, MM Dkt. No. 90-570,
at 6 (May 13, 1991); Petition for Reconsideration of Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad., supra note 42,
at 7.
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year rule because it presented a bright line-an administrable way of
discerning intent. It would ensnare what the groups believed to be the
most flagrant offenders: programs introduced simultaneously with
related toys.
The FCC and broadcast industry commenters balked at the
proposed intent test, describing it as too vague in application and as
leading to inconsistent results.' In many cases, the timing of the
products and program's respective debuts are not reliable indicators of
the programs' merit.6' For example, the Children's Television
Workshop, creator of acclaimed programs like Sesame Street, pointed
out that the two-year rule would inhibit it from introducing new shows
with accompanying toys, games, magazines, or computer software."
By contrast, the two-year rule would not touch programs like Hot
Wheels and G.I. Joe: A Real American Hero based on products already
existing for more than two years.
The Children's Television Workshop and the Donald McGannon
Communication Research Center offered a second alternative
definition of a program-length commercial. Like the FCC's rule, their
approach focused on the placement of spot advertisements. Under the
McGannon proposal, a program is a program-length commercial if
related "products appear in paid commercial advertising presented in
the context of any children's programs broadcast by the same
licensee."' In other words, a station which airs GoBots could not run
ads for GoBots toys during any of its children's programming. The
Children's Television Workshop put forward essentially the same
proposal, although it suggested that perhaps the GoBots ads might be
blocked out of only a portion of the station's children's programming,
such as only during programs aimed at preschoolers, during certain
60. See August 1991 Order, supra note 38, at 5098; Opposition of Disney, MM Dkt. No. 90-
570, at ii (June 26, 1991); Opposition of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 4
(June 26, 1991); Reply Comments of Capital Cities/ABC, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 14 (Feb. 20,
1991).
61. See Informal Reply Comments of American Family Ass'n Law Ctr., MM Dkt. No. 90-
570, at 8 (Feb. 26, 1991); see also, e.g., Opposition of Association of Nat'l Advertisers, MM Dkt.
No. 90-570, at 3 (June 26, 1991); Opposition of Disney, supra note 60, at 3-4; Reply Comments of
Capital Cities/ABC, supra note 60, at 15; Reply Comments of Motion Picture Ass'n of Am.,
supra note 49, at 4-5; Reply Comments of NBC, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 14, 18-19 (Feb. 20,
1991); Comments of Capital Cities, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 17 (Jan. 30, 1991); Comments of
CBS, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 9 (Jan. 30, 1991); Comments of Disney, supra note 49, at 20.
62, Reply Comments of Children's Television Workshop, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 11 (Feb.
20, 1991).
63. Comments of Donald McGannon Communication Research Ctr., supra note 41, at 20.
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prime children's viewing hours, or during programs which the licensee
claimed as informative or educational for purposes of license
renewal. 4
The Children's Television Workshop and Donald McGannon
Center proposals suffer several defects. First, like the FCC's rule, the
proposals misstate the nature of the program-length commercial
problem. They address only the placement of spot advertisements and
not the commercial nature of the program itself. Second, the proposals
would not necessarily accomplish their limited aims. If a child changes
the television channel, he could go straight from the Super Mario
Brothers show to a Super Mario Brothers commercial.65 The attempted
separation would be frustrated. Finally, the proposals would not touch
the barter, profit-sharing, and similar arrangements used in connection
with program-length commercials. Toy manufacturers can and do
produce products related to more than one show. A toy company
could offer the Rainbow Brite program and Pound Puppies
advertisements to one broadcaster, and the Pound Puppies program
and Rainbow Brite ads to another. The proposals therefore would
merely modify, rather than deter, such transactions. In sum, none of
the proposed alternatives to the FCC's definition of a program-length
commercial was flexible enough to effectively address the problem.
VI
The Continuing Need for an Effective Policy
The FCC's failure to adopt a stronger rule on program-length
commercials perpetuated disturbing patterns of commercialization of
children's television programming. New programs with substantial
product ties continued to appear-such as Teenage Mutant Ninja
Turtles and Mighty Morphin Power Rangers-and to generate billions
of dollars in sales.66 The merchandising and licensing aspects of new
programs remain a dominant concern in their creation. Toy
manufacturers provide creative input and financial underwriting of
programming. Further, the business practices developed during the
1980's-such as producers and broadcasters enjoying a percentage of
64. Comment of Children's Television Workshop, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 21-22 (Jan. 30,
1991).
65. Reply Comments of NBC, supra note 61, at 14-15.
66. Alan Bunce, Old Foes Rekindle Battle Over Children's Television, CHRiSTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, June 6, 1995, at 10; Children's Television: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm.
and Finance of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 12-14
(1994)(statement of Kathryn C. Montgomery, President, Center for Media Education).
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product revenue, or programs being offered to stations on a "barter"
basis in return for advertising time-decrease opportunities for
educational and informational programming. Stations have little
incentive to pay for educational programs when they can receive
heavily merchandised programs for free.'
The need for revision of the FCC's policy on program-length
commercials is further demonstrated by the agreement reached in
1996 to require a minimum of three hours of educational children's
programming per week. That accord followed years of sharp
disagreement between the television industry and public interest
advocates,' as well as a bitter division within the FCC itself,' over
how to implement the educational and informal programming segment
of the Children's Television Act. The FCC's commissioners remained
deadlocked on the issue for months. In May 1996, Commissioner
James Quello, the staunchest opponent of the three-hour rule, finally
budged. Quello announced that he would go along with a rule
requiring broadcasters to meet an "industry norm" with respect to
educational programming for children.7 Likewise, representatives of
the various industries interested in the matter grew increasingly willing
to compromise as they realized a Clinton re-election in 1996 would
mean the appointment of two new FCC commissioners and possibly
the imposition of a rule far stricter than the three-hour proposal.
71
After Quello rejected the initial draft of a compromise rule in mid-
67. Patricia Aufderheide & Kathryn Montgomery, The Impact of the Children's Television
Act on the Broadcast Market, appended to Statement of Kathryn C. Montgomery, supra note 66,
at 30-32.
68. The FCC issued a notice proposing the three-hour per week rule in April 1995. See In re
Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming and Revision of
Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10
FCC Rcd. 6308, 6311 (1995)[hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rulemaking]. FCC Chairman Reed
Hundt was the driving force behind the proposal, which children's television advocates uniformly
applauded. By contrast, broadcasters adamantly opposed any "qualification" of their obligations
with respect to children's educational programming under the 1990 Act.
69. Broadcasters found vocal allies at the FCC in Commissioners James Quello and
Andrew Barrett, who believed that a programming quota like the three-hour proposal violated
broadcasters' freedom of expression. See Edmund L. Andrews, A Bitter Feud Fouls Lines at the
FCC, N.Y. IMES, Nov. 20 1995, at D1. Angered by Hundt's terming their opposition to the
proposal a "campaign against kids," Barrett responded by publicly denouncing Hundt as a
"gutless, leaderless liar." Id.
70. See Paul Farhi, FCC's Quello Softens Opposition to Children's Educational TV Rule,
WASH. PosT, May 29, 1996, at D1; Lawrie Mifflin, A Three-Hour Rule, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1996,
at C16.
71. See Lawrie Mifflin, TV Broadcasters Agree to 3 Hours of Children's Educational
Programs a Week, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at A8.
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July because he found it "overly intrusive" on broadcasters' discretion,
the White House scheduled the late July summit meeting in an effort
to break the impasse.' 2
The National Association of Broadcasters represented the
industry interests at the bargaining table. Although the broadcasters
conceded the three-hour minimum as a general rule, they won several
points that made that rule more flexible than FCC Chairman Reed
Hundt and the children's television watchdog organizations preferred.
Most important, the three-hour rule became a "processing guideline"
or "safe harbor," rather than an absolute requirement, meaning that a
broadcaster that does not air three hours of educational programming
weekly may still pass muster through efforts like occasional specials,
short-form programming, and public service announcements.73 In
addition, the compromise granted each broadcaster the option of
paying another station in its market (such as a public broadcasting
station) to air educational programming on its behalf.74 The FCC was
not a party to the White House accord, but it voted promptly and
unanimously to accept and formalize the compromise. 7
Advertisers were well-represented at the White House summit
meeting that produced the new three-hour rule.76 They saw it as
creating new, high-minded opportunities to market products to
children, and opening the door to even greater advertiser participation
in the creation of children's programs. 7 The American Center for
72. Id.
73. See id.; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 68, at 6311, 6337-39
(describing "processing guidelines" versus "programming standard" distinction).
74. See Elizabeth Jensen & Albert R. Karr, Summit on Kids' TV Yields Compromise, WALL
ST. J., July 30, 1996, at B14. In addition, although the broadcasters unsuccessfully opposed a
requirement that educational programs counted toward the three-hour standard air between
7 a.m. and 10 p.m., they won the right to preempt their educational fare for special events or
programs. See Mifflin, supra note 71, at A8.
75. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming and
Revision of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 10, 660 (Aug. 8, 1996); FCC Sets Regulation for Minimum Level of Educational TV,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1996, at B3; Christopher Stem, Crusade Wears 'Em Down, VARIETY, Aug.
12-18, 1996, at 19.
76. Sally G. Beatty, White House Pact on TV for Kids May Prove a Marketing Bonanza,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1996, at B10.
77. Advertisers' expectations have begun to be fulfilled by the introduction of programs
like PE TV, a physical fitness program for children and teens which debut in the fall of 1996. PE
TV aims to qualify as "FCC-friendly," while providing a showcase for the shoes and sportswear
of its creator, Reebok International. See Matthew Grimm, And Now a Show from Our Sponsor,
BRANDWEEK, July 1, 1996, at 20; Zack Martin, Intersport Shops Kids Fitness Show, ELEcTRONIC
MEDIA, Jan. 8, 1996, at 6.
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Children's Television, an industry-sponsored research organization,
promptly suggested amending the Children's Television Act to permit
an extra minute of spot advertisement time during educational
programs.78 White House officials welcomed advertisers' interest,
noting that "[t]he one period in American broadcast television in
which the advertisers played a larger role in programming"-the
1950's-"most people remember fondly."' The remark overlooks a
more recent period-the 1980's-when advertisers played their
greatest role in children's television and a glut of program-length
commercials filled the airways. In short, the need continues for a more
effective policy to check the commercialization of children's
programming."
VII
How the FCC Should Regulate
Program-Length Commerdals
Although the FCC's rule-making proceeding over program-length
commercials was hotly disputed, there was surprisingly little
disagreement expressed about what sort of programs were in issue.
Public interest advocates and toy, advertising, and broadcast industry
representatives alike recognized what sort of programs were
essentially 30-minute commercials. Yet, the FCC and industry
spokespeople repeatedly contended that any definition of a program-
length commercial more far-reaching than the FCC's proposal would
threaten Sesame Street or some other valuable program. As one of the
parties indicated, "While the question [of Sesame Street] may have
some merit at a hypothetical level in helping to determine the scope
and applicability of the program-length commercial restriction, it can
hardly be taken seriously."' While everyone knew what kind of
children's programs were essentially advertisements, no one could
produce a single, abstract definition that perfectly separated them
7& See Grimm, supra note 77, at 20.
79. Id. (quoting senior aide Bill Curry).
80. The significance of rules governing commercialization of children's television is
heightened to the extent the rules serve as models for regulation of advertising directed at
children through new media technologies. See, e.g., Lawrie Mifflin, Advertisers Chase Young
People in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at A16.
81. Comments of Donald McGannon Communication Research Ctr., supra note 41, at 13.
1996]
from other programs. To paraphrase Justice Stewart, we cannot define
a program-length commercial, but we know it when we see it.3
2
Because of the difficulty of formulating an ideal, abstract
definition of a program-length commercial, the FCC should deal with
excessive commerciality in children's programming through its
primary means of enforcing the public interest obligations of
broadcasters: reviewing the licensee's performance at renewal time.8
3
Under such an approach, a broadcaster would have full discretion in
the first instance to air what it feels will entertain and serve its
audience. At the second stage-renewal-the FCC would have
discretion to evaluate the licensee's overall handling of commerciality
in its children's programming. The FCC would achieve its stated goal
of affording ample discretion to broadcastersO As the broadcast
industry demanded, the FCC would "respect[] the rights of
broadcasters to make good faith judgments."' The FCC's analysis
could take account of all relevant factors, including the licensee's and
program producers' intent, the placement and quantity of spot
advertisements, the use of barter or profit-sharing arrangements, and
the nature of the programs aired. The primary question, though, must
be whether the station is "serving the needs and interests of children
rather than exploiting them."'  As the Association of National
Advertisers recognized, "[t]o protect the public and in particular
children from so-called 'program-length' commercials requires a
careful, objective analysis of each specific program in question."'
Such an approach to the program-length commercial problem would
"address the root concerns of children's TV advocates-improving the
programming watched by the children of our Nation," rather than
"only nibbl[ing] around the edges."'
A flexible approach to this problem is the only kind that can be
effective. Abstract rules simply cannot account for the infinite
adaptability and ingenuity of the toy, television, and advertising
industries. In the 1970's, the FCC approached program-length
82. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)(Stewart, J., concurring)("I shall not attempt
further to define [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.").
83. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1994).
84. April 1991 Order, supra note 37, at 2114-15.
85. Reply Comments of Capital Cities/ABC, supra note 60, at 12.
86. Comment of Capital Cities, supra note 61, at 18.
87. Opposition of Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, supra note 61, at 4.
88. H.R. Rep. No. 101-385, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989).
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commercials this way. It sought "flexibility and an opportunity for
adjustment which is not possible with per se rules."' In Hot Wheels
and similar situations, the Commission considered the entire pattern
of facts, rather than relying on any single piece of evidence.10 Even
during the deregulatory 1980's, the FCC emphasized that this sort of
flexibility was essential. In evaluating the profit-sharing arrangement
behind Thunder Cats, the FCC explained that it was not willing to
either approve or condemn a particular practice as a general matter.9
During the rule-making proceeding on program-length commercials,
industry representatives also suggested that a flexible scheme was
necessary. The Motion Picture Association of America recommended
that the FCC consider the "totality of circumstances" in evaluating
programming.' The National Association of Broadcasters similarly
warned that "hard and fast assumptions" were inappropriate.
93
As broadcasters pointed out during the program-length
commercial proceeding, the FCC has no special expertise in answering
questions about what is best for children.' Accordingly, the FCC
should turn to experts for assistance in making its determinations. A
panel with two sorts of experts, those with knowledge of children and
those with knowledge of television, should be created to share this
decision-making responsibility. FCC Commissioner Dennis suggested
something similar in the early stages of the program-length
commercial proceeding. 5 She felt that advisory boards on advertising
could help to "elevate the consciousness of broadcasters." 91 Congress
created a similar panel in the National Endowment for Children's
Educational Television section of the Children's Television Act. This
Advisory Council consults in establishing the criteria for grants and in
selecting recipients, and consists of ten members serving without
compensation for two year terms with a maximum of three
89. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 18.
90. See Comments of Donald McGannon Communication Research Ctr., supra note 41, at
17.
91. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 18, at 714.
92. Comments of Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 4 n.5 (Jan. 30,
1991).
93. Comments of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, supra note 49, at 16..
94. Comments of Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n, et al., supra note 46, at 6.
95. In re Commercial Television Stations, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Notice




consecutive terms. 7 Each possesses expertise in "education,
psychology, child development, or television programming, or related
disciplines."'
A flexible approach to regulation of the commercial content of
children's television programming would also mirror the approach
taken by Congress and the FCC with respect to the educational and
informational requirements of the Children's Television Act. Congress
did not give the FCC specific guidelines as to how to evaluate a
broadcaster's compliance with this requirement. The Act gave the
FCC "broad discretion" in reviewing licensees' performance,99 and
gave the licensees the "greatest possible flexibility" in deciding how to
fulfill their obligation.1°° The FCC chose to maximize flexibility in its
rule-making as well. It left initial programming decisions entirely to
licensees and defined educational and informational television as
including any programming which "furthers the positive development
of children 16 years of age and under in any respect. ' 1
Enforcement of the Act's educational and informational
programming requirements has generated significant controversy, but
has demonstrated that flexible requirements are effective if taken
seriously by the FCC. In response to the Act, many broadcasters
initially claimed credit for airing programs like Leave It to Beaver,
Hard Copy, and The Flinstones.lm The FCC's early study of license
renewals found little progress in the number of hours and time slots
devoted to children's programming.' Determined to enhance
enforcement, the FCC announced it had delayed license renewals of
seven stations and requested additional information on their
compliance with the Act's requirements.' The market responded well
97, 47 U.S.C. § 394(b)(1)(B), (c)(1) (1994).
98. 47 U.S.C. § 394(e).
99. 134 CONG. REC. H3984 (daily ed. June 7, 1988)(statement of Rep. Markey).
100. 136 CONG. REc. S10,121 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)(statement of Sen. Inouye); see also id.
at S10,127 (statement of Sen. Wirth).
101. 47 C.F.R. § 73.671 (1995).
102. Richard Zoglin, If Not the Jetsons, What? Educational Shows Will Work Only if
Everyone Stops Treating Them Like Spinach, TIME, Mar. 22, 1993, at 64.
103. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Notice of
Inquiry, 58 Fed. Reg. 14,367-69 (1993).
104. See Doug Halonen, FCC Stalls Renewal of 7 Stations, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Feb. 1, 1993,
at 3. The FCC also handed down a significant number of fines and other sanctions on stations
exceeding the Act's commercial time limits or violating the FCC's program-length commercial
definition. See, e.g., Notice of Apparent Liability, Clear Channel Television, Inc., Licensee,
KTTU, 10 FCC Rcd. 3773 (1995)(fined $125,000 and renewal period limited to two years);
Northstar Television of Erie, Inc., Licensee, WSEE, 10 FCC Rcd. 3779 (1995)(fined $100,000 and
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to the FCC's demonstration of commitment to the Act. Broadcasters
demanded and television producers created new "FCC-friendly"
programs, like Nick News, Beakman's World, and Bill Nye the Science
Guy. l1
5
In sum, with a sufficiently flexible approach and expert assistance,
the FCC is capable of adequately policing the program-length
commercial problem and reducing the level of commercialization of
children's television programming.
VIII
Broadcast and Commercial Speech Under
the First Amendment
The FCC and its supporters alleged that the FCC's resolution of
the program-length commercial question was as far as the government
could go without violating rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
When contemplating bureaucratic regulation of any speech, attention
to constitutional boundaries is obviously important. However, the
courts have recognized that certain types of speech merit less First
Amendment protection than others. Advertising through children's
television lies at the intersection of two of these less sacred areas of
expression: commercial speech and broadcast speech.'
As recently as twenty years ago, the First Amendment did not
apply at all to purely commercial speech. In 1976, the Supreme Court
renewal period limited to two years); see generally Diane A. Hayes, The Children's Hour
Revisited: The Children's Television Act of 1990, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 293 (1994).
105. Bunce, supra note 66, at 8; Richard Mahler, Fear is a Great Motivator: With Government
Pressure On, Stations Scramble to Come up with Educational Shows that Both Kids and
Advertisers Will Buy, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 1993, at 7; Aufderheide & Montgomery, supra note 67,
appended to statement of Kathryn C. Montgomery, supra note 66 (study found "threats of
renewed enforcement of the law had a positive effect on the market, and thus regulation can be a
countervailing force to the powerful economic and institutional forces that govern the business").
106. Various courts have upheld regulations which restrict or even prohibit commercial,
broadcast speech against First Amendment attacks. See Posadas de P.R. Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of
P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)(sustaining Puerto Rico's ban on advertising of casino gambling aimed
at residents of Puerto Rico); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1259 (1984)(sustaining Mississippi's ban on liquor advertising by in-state media);
Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983)(sustaining Oklahoma
prohibition of broadcast ads for alcohol), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969)(sustaining FCC order requiring stations carrying cigarette ads to devote significant
time to anti-smoking viewpoint); Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1991),
aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972)(sustaining federal statute prohibiting cigarette
advertising on broadcast media).
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finally held that the Constitution did limit government regulation of
commercial speech.' ° However, commercial speech is still at the
bottom of the First Amendment ladder. Even content-based
restrictions may be permissible, given the "greater potential for
deception or confusion" inherent in commercial expression.'0 The
Supreme Court has emphasized that it is essential not to allow
commercial speech to be equated with more protected forms. First
Amendment law may be diluted if it is developed and applied without
distinction in cases involving mere commercial speech.' 9
The distinction between "speech proposing a commercial
transaction""' 0 and other speech is to be made on a "common sense"
basis."' Programs like Hot Wheels, He-Man, or Mighty Morphin
Power Rangers fall within the Court's broad definition of commercial
expression. Such programs, however, are not purely commercial
speech. That is precisely the problem with a program-length
commercial: it combines commercial with noncommercial content.
Pure commercial speech in essence says merely "I will sell you the X
[product] at the Y price."" 2 The Court has said that if the purely
commercial speech is "inextricably intertwined" with normal speech,
then the whole message will be protected by the fullest application of
the First Amendment.' 1 However, the intertwining of the two must be
truly "inextricable." For example, the Court upheld a university
regulation which prohibited product demonstrations in dormitories,
even though the presentations were a hybrid of commercial and other
speech." There was no reason why the Tupperware salespeople could
not separate their sales pitch from their home economics discourse.
Similarly, the television industry is capable of disentwining the
107. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976)(striking down Virginia ban on ads listing prescription drug prices).
108. Bolger v. Young Drug Prod., Inc., 463 U.S. 61, 65 (1983)(striking down statute against
unsolicited mailing of contraceptive ads).
109. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-66 (1978)(sustaining punishment of
attorney for personally soliciting accident victims).
110. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980)(striking down New York's restriction on advertising by public utility).
111. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985)(striking down
punishment of lawyer for advertising).
112. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760-61.
113. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1982)(striking down law
requiring charitable solicitors to disclose what percentage of donations represents solicitor's
commission).
114. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,474 (1989).
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commercial content from the other messages presented in children's
programming.
The Supreme Court fixed upon a standard test for commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service
Commission of New York."1 The regulation must (1) serve a
substantial government interest, (2) directly advance that interest, and
(3) be no more excessive than is required to serve that interest" 6 The
test does not apply and the First Amendment has no application,
however, if the commercial expression is deceptive or unlawful"l7 The
Supreme Court has recognized that whether advertising is deceptive
may depend on the audience. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the
Court found advertising by attorneys to be within the realm of the
First Amendment. 8 At the same time, the Court noted that because
of the public's unfamiliarity with sophisticated legal matters,
"misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in
other advertising may be found quite inappropriate" in the context of
legal advertising." 9
Similarly, practices that might be deemed unimportant in adult
television may be quite inappropriate for children's programming. In
1978, the staff of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") concluded
that advertising directed at children under the age of six may be unfair
and deceptive within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.12 The FTC's staff recommended a ban on such
ads.' The FTC considered such a ban, but dropped the matter
because "as a practical matter, [it] cannot be implemented."' Thus,
while child-oriented television advertising does not currently rise to
the legal definition of deceptive advertising, it is a questionable
practice. As the Supreme Court explained, the rationale for protecting
advertising under the First Amendment is society's interest in
information that allows consumers to make "intelligent and well-
115. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
116. Id. at 564.
117. Id. at 563-64.
118. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
119. Id. at 383.
120. See Termination of Rulemaking Proceeding, supra note 4.




informed" decisions. I As a result, the government has far greater
room to regulate advertising that is "more likely to deceive the public
than to inform it."'
The Constitution also tolerates far greater restriction of the right
to broadcast than to communicate through other means. 5 Broadcast
frequencies are a scarce commodity. More speakers would like to have
channels than there are channels available. 6 While it is true that all
resources are scarce, including newsprint and soapboxes, the federal
government does not control allocation of those resources. However,
the government continues to run a monopoly in the distribution of
broadcast licenses. The Supreme Court and Congress remain
committed to the scarcity argument.' Senator Inouye expressed a
point frequently made in the House and Senate about the Children's
Television Act when he said that "broadcast licenses are not like other
commodities: they are given exclusive use of a limited public resource
and they are not subject to full competition."'
The scarcity rationale has come under some attack,' but the
critiques are especially inapposite in regard to children's television.'
While a free market of ideas is the ideal for adults, the market alone
cannot sufficiently regulate children's television. While adults might
tune out overcommercialized programs, children do not have the
123. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
765,771 n.24 (1976).
124. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
125. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)(upholding fairness doctrine).
126. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 794 (1978)(sustaining
rules on newspaper and television cross-ownership).
127. Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566-67 (1990)(sustaining enhancement for minority
ownership in new licensing and distress sales); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
377 (1984)(striking down prohibition of editorializing by federally supported public
broadcasters).
128. 134 CONG. REC. S16,857 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988)(statement of Sen. Inouye).
129. See, e.g., Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 507-08
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987)(sustaining FCC's decision not to apply
requirements demanded of broadcasters to teletext); In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council,
2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5048-52 (Aug. 4, 1987), affd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990)(sustaining FCC's decision to
abandon fairness doctrine).
130. Even under a "unitary" approach to the First Amendment giving equal treatment to
broadcasters and, for example, newspapers, an effective FCC policy on program-length
commercials would not violate the First Amendment because of the commercial nature of the
regulated speech. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and
Children's Television, 45 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1201-36 (1996).
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cognitive ability to perform the same limiting function.13I According to
one Congressman, "Relying on a marketplace of children to determine
the course of children's programming is about as wise as allowing a
marketplace of children to determine their courses in school."'l
Increases in the number of media outlets also does not eliminate the
problem.'- Young children with limited or no ability to read cannot
turn to non-television alternatives available to adults, such as
newspapers or the Internet. Moreover, broadcast television is free,
unlike alternative media such as cable television and videocassettes.
Children in lower income families watch more than fifty percent more
television than those in middle and upper income households.' As
one court put it, the FCC must regulate broadcasting because the
public cannot do so, even "through a million stifled yawns."'- Young
audiences are even less capable of such regulation than adults, even
through a million glassy-eyed stares.
Broadcasters are therefore required to serve the public interest,1
to act as "proxies for the entire community"'13 and not as mere "traffic
officer[s]."' The Supreme Court has specifically emphasized the
FCC's power to regulate broadcasting in the interests of children. In
upholding the FCC's power to restrict indecent broadcasts, the Court
noted that broadcasting deserves low First Amendment protection
because of its unique pervasiveness and the fact that it is "uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read."'' 9
131. In their consideration of the 1988 and 1990 acts, members of Congress repeatedly
emphasized their belief that market forces alone are inadequate here. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No.
101-385, supra note 88, at 6; 136 CONG. REC. H5247 (daily ed. July 23, 1990)(statement of Rep.
Walgren); 136 CONG. REC. S10,122 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)(statement of Sen. Hollings); 134
CONG. REC. S16,858 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988)(statement of Sen. Wirth)("If children were
sophisticated enough to recognize the commercial hucksterism that underlies such programs,
they would quickly change the channel or shut the television set off.").
132. 133 CONG. REC. E3585 (daily ed. Sept. 16,1987)(statement of Rep. Bruce).
133. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Red. at 5044.
134. Michael J. Palumbo, Broadcast Regulation, Has the Marketplace Failed the Children:
The Children's Television Act of 1990, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 345,375 (1991).
135. National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers and Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 536
(2d Cir. 1975)(upholding prime time access rule).
136. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
137. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969).
138. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943)(sustaining chain broadcasting
regulations).
139. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978); see also Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F. 2d
1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968)("It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive
propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater
than the impact of the written word.").
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The First Amendment test for regulation of broadcast speech is
essentially the same as that for commercial speech. The restriction
must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government
interest.14 The government's interest in protecting children is clearly a
substantial one.'4' Government regulation of speech may be
"paternalistic,"' 142 but paternalism seems especially fitting in regard to
children. Children are not, as the American Association of
Advertising Agencies described them, "merely young consumers."'
According to the Supreme Court, "[it is the interest of youth itself,
and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from
abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens."' During debate on the Children's
Television Act, Congress made clear that it regarded children's needs
as a substantial interest.1' The legislators agreed that broadcasters
who air program-length commercials for children contravene the
public interest obligations they assume in return for a license "to graze
on the public airwaves."' As Senator Inouye stated, "If the licensee
cannot be required to render public service-to children as in this
legislation-because that interferes with the editorial discretion of the
licensee, that means that the entire [Communications] act is a
farce."'147 The Children's Television Act's statement of findings
reiterated that broadcasters' public interest obligations require them
140. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
141. Far less weighty interests have been deemed to be substantial for purposes of broadcast
speech regulation. See, e.g., Guschke v. City of Oklahoma City, 763 F. 2d 379, 385 (10th Cir.
1985)(upholding height zoning regulations against owner of amateur radio tower based on
aesthetic interests); Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 781 F. Supp. 632, 637 (N.D. Cal.
1991)(upholding city restriction on home satellite dishes based on neighborhood aesthetic
interests).
142. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
143. Reply Comments of Am. Ass'n of Advertising Agencies, supra note 46, at 12.
144. Prince v. Commonwealth of Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)(rejecting free exercise
challenge to child labor law by Jehovah's Witness parent convicted for allowing child to sell
church magazines).
145. 136 CONG. REC. S9662 (daily ed. July 12, 1990)(statement of Sen. Bums)("Children are
our nation's most precious resource.").
146. 136 CONG. REC. S16,340 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990)(statement of Sen. Wirth); see also, e.g.,
136 CONG. REC. H8540 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990)(statement of Rep. Cooper); 136 CONG. REC.
H5246 (daily ed. July 23, 1990)(statement of Rep. Rinaldo); id. at H5247 (statement of Rep.
Lent); id. at H5248 (statement of Rep. Bryant); 136 CONG. REC. S10,274 (daily ed. July 23,
1990)(statement of Sen. Bums); id. at S10,125 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)(statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
147. 136 CONG. REC. S10,122 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)(statement of Sen. Inouye).
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to follow advertising practices which take into account the unique
vulnerability of the child audience.'48
Given that the welfare of American children is a substantial
interest, the question becomes whether a flexible approach to
regulating program-length commercials-as illustrated by Hot
Wheels-is a constitutionally permissible means of serving that
interest.' The courts have endorsed that sort of regulatory scheme.
For example, in the 1980's, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
declined to find that the FCC's deregulation of children's television
was an abuse of discretion. While the FCC had chosen to defer to
broadcasters' judgments, the court believed that the FCC would
continue to review the adequacy of a licensee's commitment to
children at renewal and the court approved that approach.' Similarly,
the same court earlier explained that the best way for the FCC to
implement broadcast speech regulation is to impose general
affirmative duties. As a result: "The licensee has broad discretion in
giving specific content to these duties, and on application for renewal
of a license it is understood the Commission will focus on his overall
performance and good faith rather than on specific errors it may find
him to have made."'1' In sum, when the government must examine
program content, a flexible approach involving license renewal review
minimizes the First Amendment dangers.
The Supreme Court expressed the same idea in CBS v.
Democratic National Committee.' The Court held that the public
interest obligations of broadcasters do not require them to accept
editorial advertisements. A plurality of the Court explained that a
broadcaster should be afforded the "initial and primary responsibility"
as to how it will operate and meet its responsibilities to the public. At
the same time, the FCC functions as the "overseer" or "ultimate
arbiter and guardian of the public's interest."'' In other words,
deference to the broadcaster's judgment is backed up by the threat of
a lost license.
Renewal review of the licensee's overall handling of
commercialization and children's television also avoids the difficulties
148. Pub. L. No. 101-437, § 101(4)-(5), 104 Stat. 996 (1990).
149. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
150. Id. at 902.
151. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
152. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
153. Id. at 117-18.
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presented by evaluating programs in advance to determine whether or
not they are program-length commercials. Section 326 of the
Communications Act specifically forbids censorship by the FCC.54
The Supreme Court in Pacifica Foundation warned that the FCC may
not exercise prior restraint by editing inappropriate material before it
reaches the airwaves. However, the FCC is empowered to "review the
content of completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory
duties."'55
Many of the industry representatives who participated in the
FCC's rule-making proceeding on program-length commercials voiced
fear that a flexible regulatory approach would force endless,
unproductive litigation of every new show with product tie-ins.Y1 That
danger would be avoided if the FCC waited until each licensee came
up for renewal. In fact, the FCC would never have to condemn any
one program. If a producer created an extremely commercial program,
the FCC would not have to be a Draconian censor and keep the
program off the air. The producer's multi-million dollar investment in
the program would not be entirely wasted. Some broadcasters might
choose to air the program. While it would weigh against them at
renewal time, they might offset the program with other extensive
efforts to serve their young audience. The frightening image painted
by the toy and television industry-of an in terrorem FCC standing
ready to "swoop down on any broadcaster" to challenge any program
at any time-would not exist.17 Yet, the FCC would still be able to do
an effective job of deterring excessive commercialization. The FCC
would be able to act powerfully without wielding a "regulatory meat
ax.,, %
Thus, the FCC's oversight of commercialization in children's
television through license renewal review would meet the Supreme
Court's tests for restricting commercial and broadcast speech under
the First Amendment. Such regulation by the FCC would help solve
154. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994). The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against prior
restraint in a variety of First Amendment areas. E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939)(invalidating Jersey City requirement of permit for assembly in streets or parks).
155. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,735-36 (1978).
156. Opposition to Reconsideration of Kellogg's, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 2 (June 26, 1991);
Reply Comments of USA Network, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 3 (Feb. 26, 1991); Reply Comments
of Children's Television Workshop, supra note 62, at 11; Reply Comments of Cohn and Marks
on Behalf of Various Broadcasters, MM Dkt. No. 90-570, at 27 (Feb. 20, 1991).
157. See Reply Comments of Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 49, at 3-4.
158. Id. at 6.
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the problem of program-length commercials and would constitute a
reasonable and narrowly tailored means of advancing the
government's interest. A burden on commercial, broadcast speech
does not invoke the strictest First Amendment test, which would
require that the government use the absolute narrowest means to
achieve its goals. The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to
entertain overbreadth challenges to the regulation of advertising
because commercial speech is such a "hardy breed of expression. ' M
In Central Hudson, the Court struck down an absolute ban on
advertising by a power company, suggesting that the state instead
might restrict the format or content of the utility's advertising. 1 ° In
Metromedia v. City of San Diego, the Court upheld restrictions on
commercial billboards as a narrow approach compared to the more
drastic step of completely banning billboards.'61 Similarly, the First
Amendment allows the FCC to curtail the most exploitative methods
of advertising rather than, for example, banning entirely advertising
during children's television.
While the courts are somewhat more sensitive to overbroad
restrictions on broadcast speech, the proposed method of regulation is
well within the acceptable boundaries. The Pacifica Foundation
plurality, for example, recognized that a ban on indecent broadcasts
might have some chilling effect, but only on expression that was
already "at the periphery of First-Amendment concern."' 1 The same
applies to program-length commercials aimed at children.
In sum, contrary to the FCC's suggestion, a flexible approach to
regulation of program-length commercials and children's television
would be both constitutional and effective. Indeed, from Hot Wheels
through the 1970's, that approach proved its merit.
IX
Conclusion
The FCC's rule-making response to the Children's Television Act
purported to address the problem of program-length commercials, but
effectively avoided facing the issue. The rule adopted placed no limits
159. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
n.6 (1980). In other words, manufacturers interested in selling their products are unlikely to be
chilled by speech restrictions. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
160. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570-72.
161. 453 U.S. 490,508 (1981).
162. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 743-44.
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on the commercial nature of children's television programming. After
completion of the FCC's rule-making, attention focused on other
aspects of the Act's implementation, such as the Act's educational and
informational programming requirements. Meanwhile, no effective
policy exists to limit the use of children's television programs as
marketing instruments.
As FCC Commissioner Robinson said in 1974, "there is a
difference between salesmanship and exploitation."1" Program-length
commercials directed at children are the latter. In the early 1970's, the
FCC's Hot Wheels style of regulation proved to be an effective way to
combat the problem. The FCC remains capable of effectively and
constitutionally addressing the program-length commercial problem,
as it did in the past.
163. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 40.
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